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INTRODUCTION
The United States government is a government not of rigor-
ously separated powers, but of overlapping and concurrent powers:
a government of checked and balanced powers.' What strikes the
balance? A few spare words of the Constitution. This is why the
efforts of one body of government to alter the long-established
understanding of those words are taken so seriously. In a complex
structure, small changes in one body's movements can result in
systemic shifts.
A case in point involves House Rule XXI(5)(c), adopted by
the House of Representatives in January 1995.2 Under this rule,
no bill proposing to raise federal income taxes "shall be consid-
ered as passed" by the House without a three-fifths approving
vote? This "three-fifths rule" marks the first time in history that
the House has purported to alter the number of votes required to
make a bill law.
Last year, seventeen law professors published an Open Letter
(of which I was a signatory, but not an author) opining that the
three-fifths rule is unconstitutional.4 A recent essay by Professors
t Professor of Law, Yale University. My thanks to William Van Alstyne, Akhil
Amar, and Brian Sleigh.
1. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) ("In adopting this flexi-
ble understanding of separation of powers, we simply have recognized Madison's teaching
that the greatest security against tyranny-the accumulation of excessive authority in a
single Branch-lies not in a hermetic division among the Branches, but in a carefully
crafted system of checked and balanced power .... ").
2. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATWEs (104th Cong.), Rule XXI(5)(c),
reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. H23 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995).
3. See id. ("No bill . . . carrying a Federal income tax rate increase shall be consid-
ered as passed . . . unless so determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of the
Members voting.").
4. See An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539 (1995)
[hereinafter Open Letter] (signed by Bruce Ackerman and sixteen others).
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John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport criticizes the Open Letter.'
This Essay is not so much a response to their criticisms (some of
which are well taken) as an attempt to move the debate beyond
its current position. The three-fifths rule, narrowly tailored though
it may seem, raises profound constitutional issues that the com-
mentary so far has not grasped.
I. PASSING
The constitutionality of the three-fifths rule boils down to the
meaning of a single word in the Constitution: the word "passed,"
as it appears in the first clause of Article I, Section 7. Section 7
sets out the process by which Congress is to make law. The pro-
cess is simple, and every student of American government knows
it well. Every "Bill which shall have passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate" must "be presented to the President."6
The President has ten days to veto the bill. If he does not veto it,
the bill becomes law.' If he does veto it, Congress can override
the veto, but only by a two-thirds vote in both the House and
Senate.
The language of Section 7 is mandatory. Any bill that "shall
have passed" the House and Senate "shall. . . be presented" to
the President and "shall become a Law" unless vetoed.9 The only
question is how to construe the word "passed." If "passed" means
"passed by whatever number of votes each house shall deem ap-
propriate," then the three-fifths rule is constitutional. If "passed"
is properly understood to mean "passed by majority vote," then
the three-fifths rule is unconstitutional. The issue is that simple.
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport take the former position,
arguing that "the Constitution permits each house to decide how
many members are necessary to pass a bill."'" Each house is said
to have this power under Article I, Section 5, which authorizes
each chamber to determine the rules of its proceedings." This
5. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legis.
lative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
7. This is so whether he signs the bill or not. See id. The Constitution makes an
exception in the event that the ten-day period ends after Congress has adjourned. See id.
8. See id.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 486.
11. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
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interpretation of "passed"-reading it as a place-holder for the
internal voting rules each house of Congress chooses to adopt-is
obligatory if the three-fifths rule is to be defended. But it is a
misguided interpretation, and deeply so.
A. The Centrality of Majority Rule to Democracy
Opponents of the three-fifths rule have emphasized the cen-
trality of majority rule to democracy itself.'2 They have cited au-
thority, especially from our own founding era, which suggests that
the right of a majority to change the law is central to democratic
legitimacy and essential to the health of democratic nations. 3 In
reply, defenders of the three-fifths rule point to "[b]icameralism"
and "the separation of powers" as counter-examples to the rule of
majority rule (at least of popular majority rule). 4 They assert
that supermajority requirements can further "the cause of demo-
cratic self-governance" by assuring that important decisions are
made only when strongly supported by a wide range of "the elec-
torate as a whole."'" They also defend the three-fifths rule as a
wise constraint on the propensity of legislatures toward fiscal irre-
sponsibility. 6
All of these arguments are beside the point. Majority rule is
not an invariable requirement of democracy. Constitutionalism
itself, not bicameralism or the separation of powers, is the proper
counter-example. Nor does it make a difference whether the three-
fifths rule is sound fiscal policy or an impediment to Congress's
ability to respond to changing circumstances. (I have no idea
Proceedings . . ").
12. See Open Letter, supra note 4, at 1539 (stating that the three-fifths rule contrib-
utes to "erosion of our central constitutional commitments to majority rule and deliber-
ative democracy"); Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, Note, On Supermajorities and the
Constitution, 83 GEo. L.J. 2347, 2350-51 (1995).
13. The Open Letter cites a passage from The Federalist in which Madison responds
to a suggestion that the Constitution should have required a supermajority vote of Con-
gress for the passage of at least some, if not all, legislation:
In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be
passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free
government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would
rule; the power would be transferred to the minority.
Id. at 1540 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 397 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961)).
14. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 508.
15. Id. at 508, 509.
16. See id. at 509-10.
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which it is, if either.) The question is not whether the three-fifths
rule is the most politic policy or whether it would exist in the
most democratic democracy. The question is whether it is constitu-
tional.
B. Arguments from Silence and Original Intent
On the question of constitutionality, much of the debate so
far has emphasized arguments from constitutional silence and
original intent. The Constitution contains several provisions in
which supermajority votes in the House or Senate are specifically
required (such as the two-thirds vote required after a presidential
veto). But the Constitution applies no such requirement to the ini-
tial passage of bills by the House or Senate (before presentment
to the President). From this silence, one can draw clear, plausible
inferences about the Framers' intent. The only difficulty is that
one can draw two different inferences.
The argument against the three-fifths bill is that the Framers
knew how to call for supermajority votes when they wanted to, so
the absence of a supermajority provision covering the initial pas-
sage of legislation means that majority rule was intended. 7 The
reply is that, on the contrary, the Framers knew how to call for a
specific number of votes when they wanted to, so the fact that
there is no express numerical requirement concerning the initial
passage of legislation means that no particular number of votes
was required."'
The truth is that the argument from silence is not dispositive.
The same is true of the effort to establish the meaning of
"passed" on the basis of historical sources such as The Federalist,
notes from the Philadelphia Convention, and so on. These sources
contain numerous statements supporting majority rule in the
House and Senate, but arguably only with the intention that the
17. See Open Letter, supra note 4, at 1541 ("On seven different occasions, [the Con-
stitution] stipulates a supermajority requirement. . . . [But] it never places any special
obstacles in the way of the enactment of ordinary legislation signed by the President.");
see also Neals-Erik William Delker, The House Three-Fifths Tax Rule: Majority Rule, the
Framers' Intent, and the Judiciary's Role, 100 DICK. L. REv. 341, 348-50 (1996) (arguing
that "the Framers were careful to limit the use of supermajority requirements to a few
special cases").
18. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 486 ("The Constitution's silence on
the number necessary to pass a bill stands in stark contrast to other provisions that spec-
ify the requisite number to undertake particular actions.").
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House and Senate be permitted to pass legislation by majority
vote, not that they be required to do so.'9
Would the Framers have said that each house's rules-of-pro-
ceedings authority included the power to define what it means for
a bill to "pass" under Article I, Section 7? Or when they said
"rules of proceedings," did they mean to embrace only sub-consti-
tutional procedural rules such as parliamentary rules, rules of
order, committee rules, and so on? Let's put aside what the
Framers meant to be saying and consider instead what they com-
mitted to writing.
C. The Plain Meaning of the Text
The case against the three-fifths rule can be made on the
basis of the plain meaning of the constitutional text, which I shall
take to mean the meaning that would have been plain to those
who wrote and ratified the Constitution.
When someone wants to know the outcome of a majority
vote in a legislative body, ordinary English usage asks whether the
measure "passed."'  Dictionaries of older American and English
legal usage define "pass" in just such terms: "When a legislative
bill is finally assented to by a majority vote of the body... it is
said to be 'passed' by such body ... ."' Majority rule was,
moreover, the established practice of the British Parliament and
was regarded as the "natural" rule for all assemblies.' Thus, at
least where no contrary rule was specified, those who ratified the
Constitution would certainly have understood "passed" to mean
"passed by majority vote."
19. Compare Open Letter, supra note 4, at 1540 (citing critiques in The Federalist as
evidence that the Framers intentionally rejected "supermajority rule for especially sensi-
tive legislation") with McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 6, at 490-91 (distinguishing
same).
20. Indeed, the majority-rule understanding of "passed" is so conventional that it is
sometimes treated as part of that term's express meaning, rather than as a mere implica-
tion. Thus the Supreme Court has referred to "passage by a majority of both Houses" as
part of "the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action."
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983) (emphasis added).
21. 2 STEWART RAPALJE & ROBERT E. LAWENCE, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
AND ENGLISH LAv 935 § 4 (1888).
22. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, in 2 THE WRnINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1, 172 (1905); THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Manual of Parliamentary
Practice § XLI, in 2 THE WRINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON supra, at 335, 420-21.
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Unfortunately, the case for the three-fifths rule can also be
made on the basis of the plain meaning of the text. To pass, in
the legislative context, means no more than to secure the number
of favorable votes necessary for an affirmative outcome, whatever
that number of votes happens to be. This understanding was as
current in 1789 as it is today; eighteenth-century dictionaries con-
firm this usage,' and indeed the Constitution itself uses "pass" in
just this sense later in Article I, Section 7, when it provides that
Congress can "pass" a vetoed bill by a two-thirds vote in both
chambers.24 Thus, the proper meaning of "passed" in Article I,
Section 7 is "approved by whatever number of votes, or whatever
kind of vote, is called for in the operative rules of proceedings,"
and those who ratified the Constitution would clearly have so
understood it.
When we face a problem of constitutional interpretation, it is
always tempting to look to another source to resolve it: a defini-
tive statement in the legislative history, a view espoused by a
revered authority, a definition in a dictionary. At the end of the
day, however, those whom we charge with interpreting what this
nation committed to writing 200 years ago will find no authorita-
tive answer waiting for them in any extrinsic source. Which is only
to say that those whom we charge with interpreting the Constitu-
tion must-interpret the Constitution.
II. THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I, SECrION 7
And the proper interpretation of Article I, Section 7, is that
"passed by the House" means passed by majority vote of the
House.
Section 7 contains the Constitution's Lawmaking Clauses. It is
therefore one of the most central provisions-maybe the central
provision-of the entire Constitution as originally written. A con-
stitution is defined as a constitution in large part by the fact that
it provides a nation with rules of recognition for all other laws. A
constitution lays down the process by which law is to be made
and recognized, identifying the various governmental actors whose
23. See THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (6th ed. 1796) (defining "pass" as "to enact a law").
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("If after such Reconsideration two thirds of
that House shall agree to pass the Bill .. ").
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concurrence must be obtained when the awesome power to make
law for a nation is exercised.
The Lawmaking Clauses, and the questions they would an-
swer, were of critical importance to those who made the Constitu-
tion. Nearly nothing was more important to them, for example,
than the question of how much influence the various states would
have in the passage of law, or what role the President would play
in legislating.' These and other equally crucial questions were
decided by: 1) the "great compromise" that determined the differ-
ent compositions of the House and Senate; and 2) the Lawmaking
Clauses of Article I, Section 7. Deceptively simple on their sur-
face, the Lawmaking Clauses in fact embody "a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" for lawmaking in
which the great structural questions facing those who made our
Constitution were resolved.26
Section 7 strikes a balance between large and small states,
between state and federal government, between House and Senate,
between Congress and President. This balance of powers would be
entirely undone if it were true that each legislative chamber could
define what it means for that chamber to "pass" a bill. The fol-
lowing examples will make this clear.
In January 1997, led by the Representatives from California,
Texas, and New York, the delegates from the ten largest states
meet early in the Capitol and convene the first session of the
House of Representatives of the 105th Congress. 7 They pass the
"Big-Ten Rule," which states that a bill shall be deemed to have
passed the House if and only if it has secured a three-fifths vote
of the delegates of these states.
In January 1999, the House repeals the Big-Ten Rule and
passes in its stead the "Big-Three Rule." This House rule states
that a bill shall be deemed to pass according to traditional rules of
majority rule, except that in determining whether a bill has se-
cured a majority of the House, any votes cast by Representatives
of California, New York and Texas shall not be counted either in
the numerator or the denominator.
25. A brief discussion of this history can be found in Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-51.
26. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
27. They can do so because, together, they are sufficient to form a quorum. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. It is interesting to observe that the constitutional quorum re-
quirement is fixed as a "[m]ajority." Id.
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The Big-Ten and Big-Three Rules exercise the precise power
claimed by supporters of the three-fifths rule: the power of each
house to decide how many members are necessary to pass a bill.
But the Big-Ten Rule is a sort of coup d'6tat, and the Big-Three
Rule is an ouster. Surely alterations of this magnitude in the con-
stitutional allocation of powers among the states cannot be permit-
ted in the form of House "Rules of Proceedings."
It will be said, I expect, that these two hypothetical rules are
completely distinguishable from the three-fifths rule. The Big-Ten
and Big-Three Rules deprive certain Representatives and certain
states of their votes altogether. Obviously, it might be said, a
House rule violating an independent requirement such as "one-
Representative-one-vote" is unconstitutional. But where is this
"independent requirement" provided for? There is no provision in
the Constitution expressly declaring that each Representative shall
have one vote, and that each vote will be counted equally. This is
not to say that there is no one-Representative-one-vote require-
ment in the Constitution. On the contrary, there is such a require-
ment, but it follows from the majority-rule reading of Article I,
Section 7 itself.
A well-known feature of simple majority-rule voting re-
gimes-not merely as a matter of practice, but as a matter of
definition-is that each individual in the decisionmaking body gets
one equal vote.' It is of course possible to construct more com-
plex voting schemes, but a simple majority vote within a legislative
body has always meant a vote of one-half-plus-one, with each
legislator accorded one equal vote. The one-Representative-one-
vote principle central to our national lawmaking process is consti-
tutionally required precisely because "passed the House" means
"passed by majority vote of the House."2 9
To be sure, the three-fifths rule also contemplates each Rep-
resentative having exactly one vote. But the interpretation of
28. See, eg., Kenneth 0. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Con-
ditions for Simple Majority Decision, 20 ECONOMETRICA 680, 681-82 (1952) (listing as
one necessary condition for simple majority decision that "each individual be treated the
same as far as his influence on the outcome is concerned").
29. This does not mean a majority vote of all the Representatives, just as it does
not mean a majority vote of three Representatives. It means a majority vote of the
House, which is to say, a majority vote taken when a sufficient number of Representa-
tives are present to make a quorum allowing the House to act. On the Constitution's
quorum provision, see supra note 27.
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"passed" underlying the three-fifths rule does not demand this re-
sult. To support the three-fifths rule is -not to say that "passed"
means "passed by a three-fifths vote of the House." It is to say
that "passed" means "passed by whatever number of votes is
called for in the relevant House rules." It is to say, in other
words, that "passed" has no independent meaning, but is rather to
be defined by the House through its rules of proceedings. So
defined, "passed" cannot be said to require a one-Representative-
one-vote principle: the House could adopt cumulative voting, dif-
ferent states could be allotted greater or lesser numbers of votes
than their number of Representatives, or different Representatives'
votes could be weighted differently. The three-fifths rule may hap-
pen to honor the one-Representative-one-vote principle, but the
interpretation of "passed" on which it rests is perfectly consistent
with that principle's abrogation.
Supporters of the three-fifths rule have only two possible
replies. First, they can embrace the consequences of their logic
and say that the Big-Ten and Big-Three Rules are indeed constitu-
tional. If so, then they have made the case against their own posi-
tion, for surely it is a fatal argument against a proposed reading of
Article I that it permits states to be deprived of their votes in
Congress, or that it allows a few states to seize control of the
legislative powers of the nation.30
Second, supporters of the three-fifths rule can concede the
validity of the one-Representative-one-vote principle, but claim to
derive this principle from some source other than Article I, Sec-
tion 7. In this way, they could still oppose the Big-Ten and Big-
Three Rules without abandoning the three-fifths rule. But where
else in the Constitution is the one-Representative-one-vote require-
ment to be found? Because no other clause of the Constitution
expressly or implicitly calls for a one-Representative-one-vote prin-
30. The only time in the nation's history that something of this sort occurred was in
the 1860s, when a majority of the 39th Congress refused to seat the putative representa-
tives from the Southern states. This precedent in no way supports the proposition that a
state's Representatives may be wholly disenfranchised by House rule. Even on the as-
sumption that the rebellious Southern states were still 'states' at that time, entitled to
representation in Congress, the position of the 39th Congress was not that a majority of
either chamber had the power to disenfranchise states as it saw fit, but rather that, in
the exceptional circumstances of the time, the Southern states could not be represented
in Congress until their electoral processes had been reconstructed in such a way as to
assure that the suffrage had been extended to blacks and union loyalists. See generally
BRUcE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS chs. 3-6 (forthcoming 1997).
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ciple, they will have to paint that principle as some sort of consti-
tutional omnipresence, derivable from the penumbras and emana-
tions of other provisions. In fact, not only is there no provision
expressly stating that each Representative gets one vote, but there
is a provision expressly stating that each Senator gets "one
Vote."31 Thus, by the sort of power-from-silence argument that
the supporters of the three-fifths rule endorse, it should follow
that the Constitution does not require each Representative to have
one equal vote. In other words, on the theory underlying the
three-fifths rule, the House should be able to give different Repre-
sentatives different numbers of votes through a duly enacted
House rule.
A majority-rule reading of "passed" involves no such dubi-
eties. This reading makes sense of Section 7 as a whole (given the
two-thirds-override provision that follows), conforms with historical
practices, and explains other provisions of the Constitution." In
other words, the one-Representative-one-vote principle can be
conjured up through penumbras, emanations, structures, and unex-
pressed intentions, or it can be recognized in the implicit but
precise and perfectly straightforward definition of the word
"passed." A bill that has "passed the House of Representatives" is
a bill that has passed by a majority vote of the House of Repre-
sentatives.
Another example dictates the same conclusion. Suppose that
the House adopts a rule stating that all bills affecting the District
of Columbia shall be deemed to have "passed the House" only if
approved by the Mayor of the District. Everyone, I hope, will
agree that this "D.C. Rule" is unconstitutional; home rule cannot
be accomplished by House rule. But if the D.C. Rule is unconsti-
tutional, then there exists another requirement pertaining to the
passage of bills by Congress: a requirement that only the votes of
Representatives and Senators count. Where is this requirement
expressed in the Constitution?
It is expressed, once again, in the word "passed," understood
as passed by majority vote. The D.C. Rule is unconstitutional be-
cause every bill that has passed by a majority vote of the House
of Representatives and the Senate must be presented to the Presi-
31. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
32. For example, the Vice President is given the power to vote in the Senate in case
the Senators are "equally divided." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 3, cl. 4.
[Vol. 46:73
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dent and, absent a veto, shall be the law of the land-irrespective
of anyone else's approval. What it means for a bill to "pass" the
House or Senate is not open for definition by the House or Sen-
ate. It is constitutionally fixed by the implicit majority-rule mean-
ing of "passed." Unmoored from this meaning, the Lawmaking
Clauses would in no way stand against the D.C. Rule or any other
House rule attempting to give some extra-congressional figure a
vote or veto in national legislation.
Once again, to distinguish the D.C. Rule, a supporter of the
three-fifths rule would have to look elsewhere in the Constitution
than Article I, Section 7. There are, however, very few places to
look. Some other clause would have to be manipulated to produce
the only-Representatives-may-vote result.33 Even if this manipula-
tion were possible, a far more straightforward solution is available:
the votes of persons other than Representatives or Senators do
not count toward making a bill law because the Lawmaking Claus-
es already specify whose votes count. They do so by declaring that
any bill passed by a majority vote of both houses shall be a law
regardless of the approval or disapproval of anyone else in the
world, except of course the President.
Consider next a House rule requiring a nine-tenths vote for
all bills to "pass."34 Besides making it extremely difficult for any
33. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport suggest, for example, that:
[T]he House . . . could not use the authority of the Rules of Proceedings
Clause to adopt a rule permitting individuals other than members . . . to vote
on legislation, because such a rule would violate the provision of Article I, Sec-
tion 2, Clause 1 that states that '[t]he House of Representatives shall be com-
posed of Members [elected every second Year by the People of the several
States].'
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 485 n.9. It is something of a stretch to extract
the only-Representatives-may-vote principle from a clause whose obvious purpose is to
specify the length of Representatives' terms and their popular election. Such an interpre-
tation of Section 2 is not impossible, but one who adopts it is manifestly using the only-
Representatives-may-vote principle to drive the interpretation of "composed" or "Mem-
bers." Thus, even if this interpretation of Section 2 is permissible, see, eg., Michel v.
Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (adopting this reading of Section 2), why
shouldn't the same principle inform the interpretation of Section 7? Section 7 is far more
naturally read (through the majority-vote reading of "passed") to reach the only-Repre-
sentatives-may-vote conclusion, which Section 2 must be strained to yield.
In any event, if the House really has the authority to define the rules under which
a bill has "passed" for Section 7 purposes (a power not asserted in the Michel case), it is
unclear why the House could not deem a bill to have passed only if it had been ap-
proved by someone other than a member of the House. The House would not be saying
that the Mayor of the District was a "Member" of the House, merely that his approval
of legislation was necessary before a bill would be deemed to have "passed."
34. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport seem to concede that if the House can re-
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bill to become law, a "90% rule" would give California, acting
alone, the power to veto any bill that had in fact passed by a
majority vote of the House. At the same time, a 90% rule would
give small states a much greater degree of control over the legisla-
tive process than they currently enjoy. Can such fundamental
changes in the constitutional balance of powers be left to the
discretion of each legislative chamber through its "rules of pro-
ceedings"?
Finally, consider a House Rule of the following form: "A bill
shall be deemed to have 'passed' the House if it secures a two-
thirds vote, provided that an identical bill also secures a two-thirds
vote of the Senate; but if a bill does not secure a two-thirds vote
of the Senate, then the same bill shall be deemed not to have
passed the House in any circumstance." Call this the "two-thirds-
two-thirds rule," because its consequence is that federal law can
be made only upon a two-thirds vote of both legislative chambers.
Isn't it clear that such a rule fundamentally alters the structure of
the lawmaking process established by Article I, Section 7? Under
Section 7, our lawmaking process is a two-tiered process in which
the presidential veto plays a pivotal role. Article I demands a
special supermajority vote in both the House and Senate if law is
to be made without the President's concurrence. The two-thirds-
two-thirds rule transforms this process into one in which law can
only be made upon that very same bicameral supermajority vote,
rendering the President's concurrence a virtual formality. The
constitutional structure of lawmaking has been fundamentally
altered, something a mere House rule cannot be permitted to do.
One might argue that the two-thirds-two-thirds rule is differ-
ent from the three-fifths rule because it conditions the requisite
number of House votes on action taken in the Senate. It is clearly
permissible, however, for ordinary rules of proceedings in one
chamber to be conditioned on activity taken in the other. Such
rules are common, as when the House or Senate adopts confer-
ence rules conditioned on the participation of the other chamber.
If the two-thirds-two-thirds rule is different, it is different only in
that it: 1) employs a senatorial condition to increase beyond a
simple majority the number of House votes necessary for a bill to
"pass" the House; or 2) involves a senatorial condition increasing
quire a three-fifths vote to pass a bill, "there is no principled reason why it could not
also require a 99% vote." McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 504.
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beyond a simple majority the number of Senate votes necessary
for a bill to "pass" the Senate. In other words, the two-thirds-two-
thirds rule is unconstitutional precisely because Article I, Section
7, is properly read to provide that every bill which shall have
passed the House and Senate by majority vote shall, with the
President's concurrence, become law.
A vast, complex constitutional balance of powers-the powers
of states as against territories, the powers of each state as against
other states, the powers of large states as against small states, the
powers of the House, Senate, and President as against each oth-
er-is attained and embodied in the spare words of Article I,
Section 7. It strikes this balance by providing for a two-tiered
structure of lawmaking. Every bill passed by a majority vote of the
House and Senate "shall become a Law," unless the President
exercises his veto power. If the President vetoes the bill, then and
only then must a bill be passed by a supermajority of the House
and Senate in order to become law. This reading of "passed" pro-
vides a fully sufficient ground for supporting the following princi-
ples: 1) every Senator and Representative gets one equal vote;
2) only the votes of Senators and Representatives count; 3) the
relative voting power of the small and large states to pass law
cannot be changed; 4) no state can be given the power to veto
legislation passed by a majority vote of the chamber; and 5) nei-
ther chamber can transform the legislative process from a two-
tiered process with a decisive presidential veto, into a two-thirds-
two-thirds process in which the President's veto is a virtual formal-
ity. Absent this reading, the validity of every one of these princi-
ples becomes suspect. Every one of them, if it can find a purchase
at all, must cast about for other grounds, looking for security in
penumbras, emanations, and structural implications.
III. THE INFINITE REGRESS
We have thus far reflected on the importance of the majority-
rule reading of "passed" to the maintenance of various core ingre-
dients of the careful balance of powers that Article I, Section 7
establishes for the federal government. But there is also a matter
of logic to consider. Whenever a court construes an organic legal
document that establishes a legislative body without specifying the
voting rule applicable to the initial passage of legislation by that
body, the court must, as a matter of logic alone, infer some de-
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fault rule. For if the legislative body sought to legislate voting
rules for itself, it would first have to decide how many votes
would be necessary, and how to count the votes cast, in the vote
taken to decide the voting rules. To settle that meta-voting-rule, it
would need a meta-meta-voting-rule. And so on.
Thus, a default rule of one sort or another is indispensable,
and for a variety of excellent reasons, a court might read majority
rule into the organic document as the correct default rule. Under
majority rule, no legislator is preferred over any other and no
outcome is preferred over any other. Moreover, majority rule is
simple to administer; it can be said to reflect the "will of the
body" in some sense; and it has been the near-universal historical
practice of Anglo-American legislative bodies. For such reasons,
courts have long held that majority rule is the default rule for a
legislative body when the organic document does not specify oth-
erwise." In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States, inter-
preting Article I, Section 7, once so stated:
[T]he general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a
quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act
of the body. This has been the rule for all time, except so far as
in any given case the terms of the organic act under which the
body is assembled have prescribed specific limitations .... No
such limitation is found in the Federal Constitution, and there-
fore the general law of such bodies obtains.?6
If this Essay were a legal brief, it would surely have begun
with this quotation from United States v. Ballin. Ballin is, however,
an old case and did not involve an expressly contrary House or
Senate Rule. The supporters of the three-fifths rule believe they
can distinguish it,37 and in any event, we who read and write
about the Constitution have the burdensome luxury of not being
bound even by the Supreme Court. The point is that, based solely
on the need to infer some default voting rule, there is excellent
reason to read majority rule into Section 7. Combined with the
considerations advanced above, the case is overwhelming.
35. See, ag., United States v. Balfin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892); State v. Deliesseline, 12
S.C.L (1 McCord) 52, 60 (1821); Rex v. Monday, 98 Eng. Rep. 1224, 1228-29 (K.B.
1777).
36. Ballin, 144 U.S. at 5.
37. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 492-93.
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IV. THE EFFECT OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 5
Article I, Section 5 provides that each house "may determine"
its own rules of proceedings. Observe that this clause contains not
a word about the number of votes required to enact a rule of
proceeding. The three-fifths rule was, however, adopted by majori-
ty rule. In other words, supporters of the three-fifths rule (or at
least those in Congress) recognize a majority-rule default rule in
the Constitution." They simply choose to recognize it with re-
spect to the power of the House and Senate to make their own
rules of proceedings, rather than with respect to the power of the
House and Senate to make law. For supporters of the three-fifths
rule, majority rule is to be read into Section 5 despite the
Constitution's silence on the subject, whereas it must not be read
into Section 7 because of the Constitution's silence on the subject.
Thus, supporters of the three-fifths rule are doing with Section 5
what they protest against when it comes to Section 7.
To be sure, reading a majority-rule default rule into Section 5,
rather than Section 7, is not incoherent. It does not violate any
considerations of formal logic. It is simply misguided, violating
every consideration of constitutional logic. Supporters of the three-
fifths rule want to take the clause that, naturally enough, confers
upon each legislative chamber authority over its own parliamentary
proceedings and turn it into something more: a power within each
chamber fundamentally to disrupt the basic structure of national
lawmaking. Is it sensible to make the Constitution's Lawmaking
Clauses subordinate, as a matter of constitutional logic and status,
to its rules-of-proceedings clause? Is it sensible to do so at the
cost of either giving up fundamental constitutional principles (one-
Representative-one-equal-vote, only the votes of Representatives
count, and so on) or at least giving up the best and simplest
grounds for these principles?
To raise these questions, I believe, is to see their answer. The
House's authority over its own internal rules cannot be a power to
alter the basic constitutional rules of recognition-the rules that
define the Constitution as a constitution. To say otherwise would
be to put the cart before the House.
Supporters of the three-fifths rule point to the Senate's filibus-
38. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 491 & n.40.
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ter rule as a well-established rule of proceeding that also frustrates
majority rule." But the filibuster rule does not purport to alter
the Constitution's rules of recognition. Numerous committee rules
can block a bill from coming to the floor even though the bill
might or would have been passed (by majority vote) had it made
its way to a vote. Wise or unwise, such rules do not alter the cri-
teria by which the legal system determines whether an act is law.
The argument here is not that any rule impeding majority rule in
the House or Senate is unconstitutional. But a rule purportedly
changing the rule of majority rule (for the passage of laws) is
unconstitutional, because majority rule is the rule constitutionally
laid down.
V. THE REPEALABILITY OF HOUSE RULES
A final word needs to be said about the repealability of the
three-fifths rule. Supporters of the three-fifths rule claim that the
rule doesn't really overturn majority rule in lawmaking because
the House's current rules allow a fairly easy repeal or avoidance
of the three-fifths rule upon a simple majority vote.4" Indeed,
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport argue that any House rule
purporting to make itself unrepealable by a majority vote of the
House would be unconstitutional.4 Astonishingly, they support
this assertion on the basis of the same arguments-unexpressed
intentions, an unwritten principle that a legislature cannot block at
time one the functioning of majority rule at time two-that op-
ponents of the three-fifths rule have been making all along.42
This portion of their argument makes Professors McGinnis
and Rappaport vulnerable to a charge of self-contradiction, or at
least to a charge of invoking on their own behalf the very rhetori-
cal moves that they would disallow to their opponents. A partisan
of the three-fifths rule, however, need not follow Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport down this majoritarian road.43 But if
the partisan does not take the majoritarian position, then the issue
of repealability becomes irrelevant.
39. See, e.g., id. at 496-97.
40. See id. at 500-03.
41. See id. at 503-04.
42. See id. at 504-06.
43. It might be said, for example, that the House could properly make repeal of
House rules impossible except upon a supermajority vote.
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If supporters of the three-fifths rule take the majoritarian
position-that as a mere House rule, the three-fifths rule is essen-
tially repealable or avoidable at will by majority vote-then they
are saying that the three-fifths rule cannot block any bill from
passing the House that would have passed by majority vote in the
first place. In that case, the three-fifths rule is merely hortatory,
and there is no real dispute. Everyone agrees, in effect, that the
operative constitutional principle is that a bill must be permitted
to pass the House by majority vote.
If, on the other hand, supporters of the three-fifths rule do
not take the majoritarian position, they acknowledge that under
some circumstances the three-fifths rule would in fact block a bill
from passing even though a majority of those voting voted for it,
i.e., even though the bill was in fact passed by majority vote.
Which is only to say that, in some cases, the three-fifths rule
would have a real effect. This consequence was surely the idea
behind the rule, and it would appear to be quite possible under
current House rules.' If the three-fifths rule does have any real
effect, however, then for all the reasons given above it is unconsti-
tutional.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional grants of power have proven to be highly ex-
pandable. The executive branch today wields not only the execu-
tive powers specified in the Constitution, but also various legisla-
tive and judicial powers as well. In a system of rigorously separat-
ed powers, such expansion of powers would have been impermissi-
ble.
It is permissible in a system of checked and balanced powers,
however, because the principal aim of such a system is to protect
44. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport point out that current House rules permit
the amendment of any standing rules upon a simple majority vote, and that they also
permit "special rules" to be adopted for a given bill by simple majority vote. See
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 501-02. But the Professors also concede that
such action normally can be taken only if the Rules Committee forwards the appropriate
rule proposal to the floor. See id. If, therefore, Representatives favoring the three-fifths
rule controlled the Rules Committee (a not unlikely scenario), it would be logical to
expect that no such proposal would be forthcoming. Current House rules do provide for
a petition to discharge a measure from a committee, but a discharge petition must be ap-
proved by an absolute majority of the entire House, not by a majority of a quorum. See
RuLES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 2, at House Rule XXVII(3).
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against "the accumulation of excessive authority in a single
Branch," body or official 45 -to provide "security against tyran-
ny."'46 The great danger is unilateral power, and not every expan-
sion of power poses that danger. On the contrary, an expansion of
one branch's powers that creates an overlap or concurrence of
powers with another branch can be an antidote to unilateral pow-
er. At the same time, and for the same reason, a diminution in the
powers of one branch or body can in some cases pose a greater
threat to a system of checked and balanced powers than an in-
crease in powers would. Most of the expressly specified grants of
power-the presidential veto, for example-cannot be subtracted
from the system without taking away a very substantial check on
another branch's powers.
The Constitution's grants of power cannot be diminished be-
low their constitutional floor. But this contraction of a core consti-
tutional power is just what the three-fifths rule purports to accom-
plish. Article I, Section 7, grants the Congress power to make law
for the nation by majority vote, with only the President standing in
the way. The three-fifths rule is in reality the assertion of a power
to contract this core power: it is an attempt by majority vote of
the House to take away the power of Congress to make law by
majority vote. As a result, the three-fifths rule facilitates the accu-
mulation of excessive authority by other players in the constitu-
tional system. It may not have been the intent of those who enact-
ed the three-fifths rule, but the rule makes possible in principle
the seizure of the lawmaking power by the ten largest states, the
ouster of states from the lawmaking process, the vesting of a veto
power over congressional law in someone outside the federal gov-
ernment, the vesting of a veto power in a single state, and so on.
And it does all this through the unilateral action of a single legis-
lative chamber.
The power to which the three-fifths rule lays claim is the
power fundamentally to disrupt the constitutional balance of pow-
ers. Neither the House nor the Senate possesses such power, at
least not when acting through the unilateral device of making rules
of its own proceedings.
45. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989).
46. Id.
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